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COMMENTARY

Robert E. Litan*
It's a pleasure to comment on the paper by John Macey. He
always writes provocative and interesting stuff, and this paper is
no exception.
I should say at the outset that Macey has succeeded in disarming me from giving any major criticism since he's cited my
work in many places. Very clever, John. Nevertheless, I have to
say something to earn my airfare, so here it goes.
Macey's paper advances two major points. First, that regardless of the legal niceties, market forces are driving the
United States banking system toward the universal banking
model. And second, that because of the current legal niceties which John persuasively argues are not likely to change any time
soon due to the weakened political power of the banking industry - banks, as we know them today, ironically, will not participate in the trend toward universal banking. Instead, the universal banks of today and tomorrow are and will be the nonbanking giants, such as General Motors (GM), General Electric
(GE), Sears, Ford Motor - not Citicorp, Bank of America or
Nationsbank. There are elements of truth in these two propositions but I have a few reservations.
I want to start out, however, with a brief digression on what
we mean by "universal banking." Macey says it means expanded
powers for banks, and that is literally true; universal banks in
the German model actually can use deposits to fund investments
in other non-banking activities. But elsewhere in the paper, Macey seems to imply that universal banking can also be carried
out by bank holding companies or non-banking parents that
may own a bank-type, deposit-taking enterprise, such as a thrift.
Thus, it is in this broadened sense that Ford Motor is a univer* Robert E. Litan is a Senior Fellow at the Economic Studies Program of the
Brookings Institution, where he also directs the Institution's Center for Law, Economics,
and Politics. He has received a B.S. in Economics from the University of Pennsylvania,
and a J.D. and Ph.D. from Yale University.
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sal bank because it owns First Nationwide. A similar claim can
be made for GM or GE, which own their own credit card banks.
In short, under the narrow definition of universal banking,
the bank is directly involved with the non-banking activity;
whereas under the broader definition, the bank is affiliated with
the non-banking enterprise.
To those who believe in the "one happy family" theory of
corporate enterprise, this is a legal distinction without a practical difference. That is, if firewalls are useless or ignored, then it
doesn't matter whether the non-banking activity is inside or
outside the bank. Either way, the bank may be adversely affected by the failure of the non-bank, or benefited if the nonbank does well.
However, for those who believe that firewalls can be effective, it does make a difference whether the non-banking activity
is located inside or outside the bank. In particular, if you believe
in firewalls and are concerned about the possibility that
problems at non-banks may infect the bank, then you would
prefer the affiliation version of universal banking over the German model of direct bank participation in non-bank enterprises.
This is also true if you believe, as I do, that a safe version of
universal banking is the "narrow banking" model, whereby
banks narrowly investing in safe, liquid securities are given the
right to affiliate with any other type of non-banking enterprise.
Incidentally, it is still possible in the narrow bank model for the
overall organization to benefit from economies of scope, since
the narrow bank and the affiliates could use the same offices and
personnel and cross-market each others' services.
Now, I want to turn to a couple of comments on Macey's
basic thesis that universal banking is inevitable. Again, definitions are important. If by universal banking Macey means bank
participation in just securities underwriting, then he certainly is
correct. Bank holding companies already have Section 201 powers to carry out this activity, with some restrictions. I predict
that, while Congress is unlikely during the Clinton Administration to repeal Glass-Steagall, we will see the Federal Reserve
further relaxing the current restrictions on the Section 20 affiliates in the next couple of years.
1. The Glass-Steagall Act is the name commonly used to refer to the Banking Act of
1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). Section 20 of the Act is codified, as amended, at 12
U.S.C. §377 (1988).
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Moreover, such a move would be in the public interest. Macey makes clear -

crystal clear -

that securities finance is re-

placing bank-dominated finance, not just in the United States,
but to an increasing degree in Japan and Europe as well.2 And
equally important, the skills in extending a loan and underwriting a securities issue are virtually identical. Thus, it makes little
sense to preclude banks from underwriting securities.
Let's get a little more ambitious and ask whether we are
likely to see banks, affiliated with the full range of financial service activities - such as insuranci agency, underwriting, real estate agency and development. This is the so-called "one-stop"
shopping model much talked about in recent years.
There is no question that many of the non-banking companies I have mentioned have already engaged in aspects of banking. But the jury is still out on whether one-stop shopping
makes economic sense, as Helen Garten suggests in her paper.3
In fact, several recent developments suggest that many American consumers may not want one-stop financial shopping. Sears,
a company that Macey cites in his article as an example of
American-style universal banking, has just announced its intention to divest its financial divisions.4 American Express, another
aspirant to universal banking, also has had its share of troubles.
And while a number of European banks have rushed into the
arms of insurance companies, and vice versa, it is still far from
clear whether these marriages will prove financially fruitful.
Incidentally, Macey seems to think that the skills for succeeding in banking and insurance are transferable. 5 While a
banking organization can certainly benefit from sharing customer lists for the two activities, it is not true that selling or
underwriting insurance requires the same skills as attracting depositers and making loans.
In short, we still don't know to what extent banks and nonbanks will want to diversify broadly into each others' businesses
and what combinations will prove most economically attractive.
2. On this point, see the excellent analysis in International Monetary Fund, International Capital Markets: Developments, Prospects and Policy Issues (Washington,
D.C., 1992).
3. See Helen A. Garten, UniversalBanking and FinancialStability, 19 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 159 (1993).
4. Suzanne Bilello, Sears to Spend $4B to Remake Stores, NEWSDAY, February 12,
1993, at 50.
5. Jonathan R. Macey, The Inevitability of Universal Banking,
19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 203 (1993).
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Presumably, Macey would answer that this is an issue we should
let the market decide, and, fundamentally, I would agree with
him.
At the same time, however, there is danger in mixing banking, finance, and commerce, more so than is true today. The risk
is that the federal safety net will thereby get extended to cover
not just banks, but a much broader sector of the economy. I continue to believe that the best way of preventing this from happening is to allow only the narrow banking version of universal
banking, which would insulate banks and the federal insurance
fund from any financial difficulties experienced by non-banking
activities. One missing element in Macey's excellent paper is a
statement as to which universal banking model he would prescribe for the United States, and whether any of the models actually matter.
Finally, I have a couple of observations on the three policy
reforms that Geoffrey Miller recommended in his comments on
Professor Lichtenstein's paper.6 First, I question the willingness
of banks to issue "double-liability" or "assessable" common
stock. This is particularly true at the present time when many
large banks have been reluctantly selling their non-assessable
common stock in order to bring themselves safely into compliance with stiffer capital requirements.
Second, I also question the advisability of scaling back deposit insurance. In my view, depositors are highly unstable
sources of discipline because they can run on a moment's notice.
Holders of longer-term subordinated (and uninsured) debt provide a much more stable source of discipline precisely because
they cannot run, but instead must wait until their debt matures
to recover their investment.
For this reason, I strongly favor requiring all large banks perhaps those with assets above $1 billion that currently have
access to the capital markets - to meet part of their capital
requirement by issuing subordinated debt. For example, two
percent of the eight percent Tier II risk-weighted capital requirement could be made up of subordinated debt. Such a requirement would mean that any large bank that wanted to expand its deposit base would constantly have to go to the market
6. See Cynthia C. Lichtenstein, InternationalStandardsfor ConsolidatedSupervision of Financial Conglomerates, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 137 (1993); Geoffrey P. Miller,
Universal Banking and FinancialStability, 19 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 197 (1993).
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to sell its subordinated debt. That market, in turn, would discourage large banks from taking many of the risks they became
accustomed to taking during the 1980s.
Finally, I fully agree with Geoffrey Miller and Jonathan Macey that nationwide interstate branching and banking is long
overdue. There is no rational reason for the current geographic
restrictions, which only have contributed to the weakness of the
United States banking system.
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